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CASE COMMENTS
Products Liability-AuTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER MUST DESIGN AND
BUILD A CRASHWORTHY AUTOMOBILE-Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho,
327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
On March 1, 1970, Michael Evancho was a passenger in the rear
seat of a 1970 Mercury Montego traveling on State Road 826 in Dade
County, Florida. The Mercury collided with a parked car, and
Michael was thrown forward against the back of the front seat. The
locking device securing the seat failed, allowing it to slide forward.
Michael then fell to the floor, and his head struck the exposed sharp
edges of the seat rail. The resulting injuries caused his death."
Mary Evancho, Michael's wife, filed a wrongful death action against
the drivers of both automobiles, the Hertz Corporation, and the Ford
Motor Company.2 Her complaint alleged that Ford Motor Company
negligently designed and manufactured the track and rail mechanism,
and that as a result the seat could not withstand the impact of a
person thrown forward in a collision.3
Ford moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that the auto-
mobile was operated in a manner beyond its intended use and Ford
therefore owed no duty to Michael Evancho.4 The Circuit Court for
Dade County dismissed the complaint and Mrs. Evancho appealed.5
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the order dismissing
Mrs. Evancho's complaint against Ford and remanded the cause for
further proceedings. 6 In addition, the district court certified as a
matter of great public interest 7 the following question: "Whether a
manufacturer of automobiles may be liable to a user of the automobile
for a defect in manufacture which causes injury to the user when the
1. This synopsis of facts is drawn from Respondent's Brief at 2-4, Ford Motor
Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976). Petitioner, Ford Motor Co., simply in-
corporated by reference the statement of the case and facts from the Third District
Court of Appeal. Petitioner's Brief at 1. Petitioner did not dispute respondent's state-
ment of facts. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2. Petitioner was a co-defendant in the
circuit court and a co-appellee in the district court of appeal. The supreme court
opinion did not include a comprehensive statement of the facts.
2. Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
3. Brief for Respondent at 2. The complaint sought relief on the theories of
breach of warranty, negligence in design and construction, and strict liability in tort.
Id. at 4.
4. 327 So. 2d at 202.
5. Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
6. Id. at 44.
7. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3), provides: "[The supreme court] [relay review by
certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal that . . . passes upon a question
certified by a district court of appeal to be of great public interest .... "
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injury occurs as the result of a collision and the defect did not cause
the collision?" 8
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida held that a
manufacturer of automobiles may be found liable under a theory
of common-law negligence for a design or manufacturing defect which
causes injury but which is not the cause of the collision.9 In reaching
its decision, the court focused on two landmark cases illustrating the
opposing viewpoints on the issue: Evans v. General Motors Corp. 0
and Larsen v. General Motors Corp." In both cases the plaintiffs sought
damages from General Motors (GM) for a death caused by the allegedly
negligent design of a GM automobile, and in both cases the design
features which allegedly caused the fatal injuries did not cause the
collision. The Seventh Circuit in Evans and the Eighth Circuit in
Larsen recognized the pivotal issue of law: "The major question
before us is the nature of the duty which an automobile manufacturer
owes to users of its product. This presents an issue of law for the
Court."12
In Evans, the plaintiff argued that the 1961 Chevrolet in which
Roy Evans was killed had been negligently designed because it had
an "X" frame with no side rails to protect the driver.13 When the
automobile was struck broadside, the left side collapsed on Evans,
causing fatal injuries. The plaintiff contended that broadside collisions
were foreseeable and that GM created an unreasonable risk of harm
to the occupants by omitting side rails.14 The court and the parties
agreed that the manufacturer "had a duty to design its automobile to
be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was made, without hiding
defects which would make it dangerous to persons so using it."'15
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that GM's duty of design did
not include protecting a passenger from the effects of a broadside
collision, for the frame of the automobile need only be fit for its
intended purpose and "[t]he intended purpose of an automobile does
not include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite
the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions
8. 327 So. 2d at 202.
9. id.
10. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
11. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
12. 359 F.2d at 824. The Eighth Circuit stated the issue in Larsen: "Both parties
agree that the question of a manufacturer's duty in the design of an automobile or
of any chattel is a question of law for the court. The decisional law is in accord." 391
F.2d at 498 (citations omitted).
13. 359 F.2d at 823.




may occur."' 6 This narrow interpretation of intended use may have
originated in doubts about the effectiveness of a perimeter frame, for
the court noted that the decedent might have been killed or injured
even if his automobile had been constructed with a perimeter frame.
17
A finding of negligence would have required a costly redesign of all
GM automobiles on the speculative basis that side rails would protect
most occupants in most broadside collisions. The Seventh Circuit
relied solely on Campo v. Scofield' in holding that a manufacturer
need not make its automobiles safer in collisions or make them crash-
proof. Campo involved a farmworker whose hands were injured by
the open, unprotected roller mechanism of an "onion-topping" machine.
The Court of Appeals of New York held that a manufacturer has no
duty to design his machinery to protect a user from obvious hazards
or to provide safeguards against a user's careless conduct.19 Apparently
the Seventh Circuit reasoned, by analogy to Campo, that a collision
was an obvious hazard and being involved in a collision was careless
conduct.
Two important considerations were ignored by the Seventh Circuit
in Evans. First, although accidents are not an intended use of auto-
mobiles, they commonly occur in normal use and thus are fairly
within the contemplation of the designer. 20 Second, it is widely
recognized that a particular design feature of an automobile can
exacerbate the injuries of an occupant after the initial collision between
an automobile and another object and that an automobile can be
16. Id. at 825.
17. Id. at 824.
18. 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950).
19. Id. at 806. The Campo doctrine that a manufacturer has no duty to protect
a user against open and obvious defects has been widely followed in products liability
law. It retains its vitality despite the criticism that it encourages dangerous design in
an obvious form. See Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1975). But see
Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1975) (where knowledge of a
dangerous condition cannot prevent injury, the manufacturer cannot avoid liability by
claiming that the dangerous condition was obvious). The Campo doctrine has been
applied to automobile design cases. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 305 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1973).
In Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies, 327 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), the
First District Court of Appeal cited Campo but noted that it would be reasonable to
modify the patent danger rule so a manufacturer could not market unreasonably
dangerous machines with impunity. Id. at 81. The First District also certified the
following question of great public interest: "May the manufacturer of a machine in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user be held liable to an injured
user notwithstanding that the condition was obviously dangerous?" Id. at 82. The
parties did not petition for certiorari, however.
Despite its acceptance in other jurisdictions, the Campo doctrine was substantially
altered-if not overruled-by the New York Court of Appeals. Micallef v. Miehle Co.,
Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
20. See O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. RaV. 299 (1963).
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designed to expose the occupant to fewer risks in collisions.21 This
aspect of automobile design is termed "crashworthiness."2 2 Both auto-
makers and the public know that automobiles can presently be de-
signed to be more crashworthy,22 and the Eighth Circuit considered
this issue in reaching its decision in Larsen v. General Motors.
2 4
In Larsen, the plaintiff received severe head injuries in a head-on
collision which occurred while he was driving a 1963 Corvair.2 5 The
impact caused a violent rearward movement of the steering shaft into
the plaintiff's head. The plaintiff alleged negligence in the Corvair's
design: the solid steering shaft extended beyond the front tires, and
thus the rearward displacement in a head-on collision was much greater
than it would have been in other automobile models not so con-
structed.26 GM rested its defense on the narrow Evans concept of in-
tended use.2 7 The Larsen court took a different view, however, holding
that the manufacturer has a duty of reasonable care in light of fore-
seeable hazards, based on common-law negligence. 2 The court first
noted that the manufacturer's duty in design extends not only to the
intended use of a product but also to any foreseeable emergency situa-
tion.29 The court went on to find that although automobiles are made
for use in transporting persons and cargo, "[t]his intended use cannot
be carried out without encountering in varying degrees the statistically
proved hazard of injury-producing impacts of various types. ' ' 30 Thus,
injuries due to collisions are foreseeable as incident to normal use, and
[w]here the injuries or enhanced injuries are due to the manufacturer's
failure to use reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user of its
products to an unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence
principles should be applicable. The sole function of an automobile
is not just to provide a means of transportation, it is to provide a
means of safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably possible under
the present state of the art.2x
21. Id. at 348-56.
22. The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1901(14)
(Supp. IV 1975), defines "crashworthiness" as "the protection that a passenger motor
vehicle affords its passengers against personal injury or death as a result of a motor
vehicle accident."
23. O'Connell, supra note 20, cites numerous industry studies in crashworthiness
design which have been published in national magazines and professional publications
of the automobile industry.
24. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
25. Id. at 496.
26. Id. at 497.
27. Id. at 498.
28. Id. at 503.
29. Id. at 501.
30. id. at 501-02.
31. Id. at 502 (footnote omitted).
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The court stressed, however, that the manufacturer is subject only
to a duty to use reasonable care and is not required to design an
accident-proof or crashproof vehicle31
The Eighth Circuit's stress on the foreseeability of collisions has
led to a criticism that the court relied on foreseeability alone in extend-
ing the duty of the manufacturer 33 and ignored the considerations of
fairness and public policy which are also involved. s3 A close reading
of the opinion discloses, however, that the Eighth Circuit stressed the
foreseeability and statistical inevitability of accidents to justify its de-
parture from the previous narrow interpretation of intended use. The
court evidently felt that the same justification which allows recovery
when the defect causes the accident applies when the defect causes
injury even though the collision resulted from other causes.3 5 Thus
the Larsen court concluded that a manufacturer does have a duty to
use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of an automobile
32. Id. at 503.
33. Hoenig and Goetz, A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The
Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 1 (1974), stating: "The Larsen decision
reflects a basic conceptual error. The primary assumption of the decision was that duty
should be coextensive with foreseeability." Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
34. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 186 A.2d 291 (N.J. 1962). In Gold-
berg, the New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed a claim brought against the operator of
a public housing development by a person who had been assaulted and robbed in the
development. Plaintiff contended that the operator had a duty to provide protection
against foreseeable criminal assaults. The court stated:
The question is not simply whether a criminal event is foreseeable, but whether
a duty exists to take measures to guard against it. Whether a duty exists is
ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relation-
ship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed
solution.
Id. at 293 (emphasis in original). The Goldberg court found that the operator had no
such duty. But an apartment operator was held to a duty to provide protection under
very similar facts in Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
35. 391 F.2d at 502 ("No rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations
where the defect in design or manufacture was the causative factor of the accident ....
Dean Prosser agrees that the extension of liability is reasonable:
The current lively controversy over automobile design is over whether the maker
is under a duty to make the car "crashworthy," or in other words, to prevent
injury from what has been called the "second collision," when the plaintiff
comes in contact with some part of the automobile after the crash. The greater
number of decisions have denied any duty to protect against the consequences
of collisions, on the rather specious ground that collision is not the intended
use of the car, but is an abnormal use which relieves the maker of responsibility.
It is, however, clearly a foreseeable danger arising out of the intended use; and it
cannot be expected that this reasoning will continue to hold.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs § 96, at 646 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted).
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to protect against unreasonable risk of injury or enhancement of
injury in the event of a collisiona
In Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho,37 the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the reasoning of the Larsen decision, quoting extensively from
the Larsen court's analysis of intended use and the liability of a
manufacturer for failing to exercise reasonable care in design. 3 The
Florida court joins the courts of eleven other states which have ruled
that a manufacturer will be liable for design defects which expose
passengers to unreasonable risk of harm in a collision. 9
The adoption of the Larsen doctrine is a timely and consistent
development in Florida products liability law, especially as it pertains
to automobile accident cases. The landmark Florida case on a manu-
facturer's liability for design defects is Matthews v. Lawnlite Co. 40 In
Matthews a manufacturer of lawn chairs was held liable when the rocker
mechanism of a chair amputated a potential purchaser's finger. In this
1956 decision, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted section 398 of
the Restatement of Torts as a "doctrine more in line with reason and
justice."4' 1 Section 398 provides that a manufacturer is liable "for bodily
harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption
of a safe plan or design. '" 42 In 1968, the Third District Court of Appeal
noted that "[t]he age old doctrine of caveat emptor [has] a limited
utility in an age of highly sophisticated products when users are forced
to rely without inspection or knowledge upon the competence and
36. 391 F.2d at 504.
37. 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
38. Id. at 204.
39. Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Ct. App. 1970); Friend
v. General Motors Corp., 165 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968), cert. dismissed, 167 S.E.2d
926 (Ga. 1969); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. ,1974);
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973) (applying
strict liability); Friedrich v. Anderson, 217 N.W. 2d 831 (Neb. 1974); Bolm v. Triumph
Corp., 305 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1973); Storey v. Exhaust Specialties and Parts, Inc., 464
P.2d 831 (Ore. 1970); Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969); Engberg v.
Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973) (applying strict liability); Arbet v.
Gussarson, 225 N.W.2d 431 (Wis. 1975) (applying strict liability). A number of
federal courts have construed state law. The decisions are collected in Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d
560 (1972).
40. 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
41. Id. at 300.
42. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 398 (1934), quoted in Matthews v. Lawnlite, 88 So. 2d
299, 300 (Fla. 1956), as follows:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it
dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to
others whom he should expect to use the chattel lawfully or to be in the vicinity
of its probable use for bodily harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable
care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.
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specialized knowledge of manufacturers. ' '4 3 In 1973, the Supreme Court
of Florida adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence to foster a
more equitable system of recovery for personal injuries and property
damage4 4 and stated this view of the automobile accident problem:
One of the most pressing social problems facing us today is the
automobile accident problem, for the bulk of tort litigation involves
the dangerous instrumentality known as the automobile. Our society
must be concerned with accident prevention and compensation of
victims of accidents . . . . [W]e must recognize the problem of
determining a method of securing just and adequate compensation
of accident victims who have a good cause of action. 45
The Evancho decision places part of the burden of preventing acci-
dents and compensating accident victims on the manufacturer.
In Evancho, the Florida Supreme Court posed, but did not answer,
two other important questions: first, whether the manufacturer may
be a joint tortfeasor; and second, whether a manufacturer can plead
the lack of use of safety devices as a defense.46 Decisions in other cases,
however, shed some light on these questions.
A reading of Florida law suggests that if there is no logical and
reasonable way to apportion damage resulting from a collision, a
manufacturer may be a joint tortfeasor and thereby jointly and severally
liable for all the damage. The Eighth Circuit's Larsen decision 47 ex-
pressly provided that a manufacturer should be liable only for the
damage or injury caused by the defective design and not for the
damage or injury that probably would have occurred absent the de-
fective design.48 Florida decisions on apportionment of damages suggest
that Florida courts will reach the same result as Larsen-provided that
damages can be apportioned in a logical and reasonable manner.4 9
43. Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg., Co., 205 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.)
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968).
44. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
45. Id. at 436.
46. 327 So. 2d at 204 n.4.
47. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 503.
49. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Millens, 294 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1974), approving the following jury instruc-
tion:
The court charges you that if a plaintiff has suffered injuries as a result of
two accidents occurring almost simultaneously, a jury should apportion the damages
if they can do so in a logical and reasonable manner, but if there can be no
apportionment then the defendant is liable for the entire damages .... [citations
omitted.]
In Win. G. Roe & Co. v. Armour & Co., 414 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 1969), the Fifth
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Where the damages are inseparable, however, Florida courts follow
the rule announced in Feinstone v. Allison Hospital: "The rule is well
settled that if two or more wrongdoers negligently contribute to the
personal injury of another by their several acts, which operate con-
currently, so that in effect the damages suffered are rendered in-
separable, they are jointly and severally liable."50 But before joint
and several liability can be imposed the plaintiff must prove a causal
connection between the design defect and the injury.51 In other words,
the plaintiff need not prove the exact amount of the damage caused
by the defective design, but he must show with reasonable certainty
that the defective design caused damage.52
Circuit, applying Florida law, noted that "[i]n the absence of concert of action or the
breach of a joint duty by the defendants, joint and several liability will be imposed
only where the resulting harm is of an indivisible nature and is not subject to rational
apportionment." Dean Prosser has pointed out that it is actually incorrect to call a
concurrent but independent wrongdoer a joint tortfeasor when joint and several liability
is imposed. Liability is not based on a presumed concert of action or vicarious liability,
but on the principle that "the defendant is liable for all consequences proximately
caused by his wrongful act." W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs § 47, at 297
(4th ed. 1971).
For a contrary view as to crashworthiness cases, see Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d
Cir. 1976). A three-judge panel applying New Jersey law held that a manufacturer
who is sued for injuries caused by a design defect cannot be considered a joint tort-
feasor due to the absence of contemporaneous action. id. at 738. In Huddell, the driver
of the other vehicle involved in the collision could be held liable for all the damages,
but the manufacturer only for the enhanced injury. Id.
50. 143 So. 251, 252 (Fla. 1932). Accord, De La Concha v. Pinero, 104 So. 2d 25
(Fla. 1958) (separate acts of two automobile drivers concurred to produce a single in-
divisible injury to plaintiff); Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Millens, 294 So. 2d
38 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1974) (separate automobile
collisions causing inseparable injuries resulted in joint and several liability for ambulance
service involved in the second collision).
51. Asgrow-Kilgore Co. v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 301 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 1974)
states:
The sine qua non of a negligence action is an actual causal connection between
the negligent act and the injury. More easily defined than applied, the concept
of proximate cause can be quite difficult. Incapable of precise proof as it some-
times may be in a given case, it must be shown by competent proof to be a
"material and substantial factor in bringing it [the injury] about." [citation omitted.]
See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Merritt, 531 S.W.2d 938 (Ark. 1976) (plaintiff
failed to prove that the allegedly defective design feature had been a proximate cause
of his injury).
52. But see Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
The plaintiff claimed that he was injured when his automobile was struck from the
rear and the back of his seat collapsed rearward. The district court, applying Florida
law, ruled that the plaintiff did not establish "beyond mere speculation that the de-
fendant's act [in making a defective seat back] in fact caused the plaintiff's injury."
Id. at 118. It appears from the opinion, however, that the court relied on plaintiff's
doctor's testimony that he could not separate the injuries caused by the impact from
those which may have been caused by the collapse of the seat. This was an overly
strict application of Florida law as set out in Asgrow-Kilgore Co.: plaintiff should not
[Vol. 5
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If joint and several liability is imposed and the manufacturer pays
more than his equitable share of the common liability based on the
tortfeasors' relative degrees of fault, or if he enters into a settlement
and satisfies the total liability, the manufacturer has a right to seek
contribution from the other tortfeasors under the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act.53 His right to contribution is limited to
the amount paid in excess of his proportionate share, and a recent
amendment to the Act provides that the proportionate shares of joint
tortfeasors will be based on their relative degrees of fault. 54 Thus, where
the damages are inseparable the manufacturer's share of the common
liability will depend on a court or jury apportionment of fault between
the negligent parties. 55
Florida courts have consistently held that a person is not protected
from his own careless use of a dangerous instrument. 56 Thus, under
Florida law a manufacturer should be entitled to raise as a defense the
plaintiff's failure to use available safety devices that a reasonably pru-
have been required to separate the injuries but only to prove that the collapse of the
seat was a material and substantial factor in bringing about the injuries.
53. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975) provides in pertinent part:
(2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION.-
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons
become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or
property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among
them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has
paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery
is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor
is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire
liability.
54. FLA. STAT. 768.31(3)(a) (1976 Supp.) provides:
768.31 Contribution among tortfeasors.-
(3) PRO RATA SHARES.-In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors
in the entire liability:
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability.
55. It is an obvious Paradox to say that a concurrent tortfeasor -may be jointly
and severally liable because there is no logical and reasonable way to apportion damages,
but then will have a right of contribution based on relative degrees of fault. However,
this system does strike a balance between competing policies. It is more equitable to
allow a plaintiff to recover from any one of several negligent tortfeasors than to
deny him relief because of an inability to prove the share of damages attributable to
each tortfeasor. Once plaintiff's recovery is assured, however, contribution among the
tortfeasors based on the court's or jury's apportionment of fault is the fairest way to
spread the burden of loss. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973). Difficul-
ties in proving the apportionment or obtaining satisfaction of the resulting judgment
will fall on the tortfeasors rather than on the injured plaintiff. But see Huddell v. Levin,
537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
56. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956); Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies,
327 So. 2d 76 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205
So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App., cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968).
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dent person would have used, if that failure was a proximate contribut-
ing cause of the plaintiff's injuries. A reasonable person can fairly be
assumed to appreciate the risk of being injured in an. automobile
collision, and if a manufacturer is held to a duty of care because
collisions are foreseeable and statistically inevitable, certainly a driver
or passenger should be required to use ordinary care to protect himself.
A driver who unreasonably failed to use a safety device and was thereby
injured in a collision should bear some responsibility for his injury.
The only Florida District Court of Appeal to consider such a defense,
however, refused to permit a defendant to present evidence of a
plaintiff's failure to use a seatbelt.
5 7
Since Florida now has comparative negligence, a plaintiff's un-
reasonable failure to use a safety device will not completely bar re-
covery, but the plaintiff will be prevented from recovering the portion
of the damages for which he is responsible.58 In the instant case, for
example, had Michael Evancho been restrained by a seatbelt, he might
not have fallen on the exposed seat rail that allegedly caused his fatal
injury. If the manufacturer could offer proof that a seat belt was avail-
able but not used, a jury might find that Michael Evancho bore a share
of responsibility.
Although the Evancho decision based the automaker's liability
solely on common-law negligence,5 9 it now appears that crashworthiness
claims can be brought in Florida under a strict liability theory as well.
In West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 6° decided six months after Evancho,
the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the doctrine of strict liability
as stated in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.6 1
Numerous crashworthiness decisions in other jurisdictions have been
based on strict liability, 2 and Dean Wade has noted that "a court
which appears to be taking the radical step of changing from negligence
to strict liability for products is really doing nothing more than adopt-
57. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966). In Brown,
the court held such evidence inadmissible because the "defendant had not shown, except
by conjecture, that the use of the seat belts would have prevented the injury complained
of." Id. at 51. Evancho has clearly eroded the basis of the Brown decision.
58. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973).
59. 327 So. 2d at 203. The court noted that the manufacturer's liability was not
based on a theory of breach of warranty or strict liability, but solely on a theory of
common law negligence.
60. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
61. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965).
62. See, e.g., Polk v. Ford Motor, Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 907 (1976); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
and cases annotated "strict liability" in note 39 supra.
[Vol. 5
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ing a rule that selling a dangerously unsafe chattel is negligence within
itself."63
Section 402A states two requirements for liability: (1) that the
product be in a defective condition and (2) that it be unreasonably
dangerous. In a crashworthiness case brought under common-law
negligence principles, the plaintiff normally attempts to prove that
the design of the automobile exposed him to an unreasonable risk of
injury,64 from which it follows that the design was defective and the
manufacturer negligent. Clearly the same proof would establish that
the automobile was defective and unreasonably dangerous, and thus
would support a claim under section 402A.
Note that in both negligence and strict liability claims, the auto-
mobile may be defective only because it is unreasonably dangerous: the
sole factual question is whether the automobile is unreasonably
dangerous.65 Dean Wade observes that in cases involving dangerous
designs it would be better "not to refer to any requirement of defective-
ness."6 6 Note, too, that section 402A does not require a finding that
the manufacturer behaved negligently, but such a finding is clearly
implied where the plaintiff proves that the manufacturer's conscious
design choice was unreasonably dangerous.
The application of section 402A will affect crashworthiness cases
in Florida in two additional respects. First, it will expand the class
of defendants available to the injured plaintiff. Comment f makes it
clear that strict liability should apply to "any manufacturer [or] ...
any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor ...... 67 The Restate-
ment bases this extended liability on the special responsibility for
63. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965).
64. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Evans
v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
65. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir. 1974); Mont-
gomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability
for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. Rav. 803 (1976); Wade, supra note 63,-at 14-15.
66. Wade, supra note 63, at 15; see text accompanying notes 78-80 infra.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965):
f. Business of selling. The rule stated in this Section applies to any person
engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption. It therefore
applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer
or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant. It is not necessary that the
seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such products. Thus the rule
applies to the owner of a motion picture theatre who sells popcorn or ice cream,
either for consumption on the premises or in packages to be taken home.
...The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for
the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of
supplying human beings with products which may endanger the safety of their
persons and property, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the
part of those who purchase such goods.
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consumer safety assumed by the supplier of potentially dangerous
products. 68 This extension of liability is consistent with Florida law;
Florida courts have long used a similar rule of special responsibility
to impose strict liability on the owners of products classified as
"dangerous instrumentalities. "69
Comment n of section 402A also provides that:
[T]he form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and
commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user
or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and
is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.7 0
This approach is contrary to the recent decision of the Florida Supreme
Court in Blackburn v. Dorta, holding that assumption of risk has been
merged with contributory negligence and no longer serves as a com-
plete defense.71 The court noted that when a person voluntarily and
unreasonably exposes himself to a known danger "his conduct can
just as readily be characterized as contributory negligence. It is the
failure to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent man under similar
circumstances." 7 2
It is unlikely that any defense based on knowledge of the risk and
voluntary use of the dangerous product will have extensive applica-
tion in crashworthiness cases, because automobiles often are the only
reasonable means of transportation and the risks of use are not obvious
to a casual observer. Although the public may have information indicat-
ing that some automobile designs are dangerous, often only an automo-
tive safety engineer would know and appreciate the risk of injury
associated with a particular design feature when assessed in light of
68. Id.
69. Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Dep't Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1974):
Florida has long recognized that certain instrumentalities are "dangerous
instrumentalities" per se, such as an automobile driven on the highways (Southern
Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 1920, 80 Fla. 44, 86 So. 629), an airplane in operation,
(Shattuck v. Mullen, Fla. App. 1959, 115 So. 2d 597), an operated motorcycle,
(Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Michel, 1935, 120 Fla. 511, 163 So. 86) ....
and strict liability has been imposed upon the owners thereof for their improper
use.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965) (emphasis added).
The Florida Supreme Court quoted comment n with approval in West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976).
71. Blackburn v. Dorta, No. 46,621, slip op. at 10 (Fla. May 5, 1977).
72. Id., slip op. at 8.
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the range of potential collisions. It would be unreasonable to expect
the public to recognize dangerous designs either before purchasing an
automobile or in the course of normal use. 73 Even assuming that follow-
ing purchase an automobile owner becomes aware of a particular
risk, driving an automobile with a dangerous design feature does not
satisfy the requirement of voluntariness, 74 for a consumer has little
chance of having a dealer or manufacturer replace the automobile or
make it more crashworthy. For an act to be voluntary there must be a
reasonable alternative, and in most Florida cities there is no reasonable
alternative to automobile transportation. The automobile is one of the
most complex products used by the general public, and as the Florida
Supreme Court in West said: "In today's world it is often only the
manufacturer who can fairly be said to know and understand when
an article is suitably designed and safely made for its intended
purpose. "7 5
Whether Florida courts apply strict liability or negligence
principles to crashworthiness cases, the courts must define standards
to determine fairly and consistently a manufacturer's liability for
injuries caused by a particular design feature. The standards presently
used for both negligence and strict liability are inadequate. The
strict liability provisions of section 402A and the general negligence
principles of Florida's products liability law require that the plaintiff's
injury be caused by some defect in the product. Under section 402A
a product must be "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user ' '7 6 before the seller is liable. Florida negligence law
generally holds that "when [an] injury is in no way attributable to a
defect, there is no basis for imposing product liability upon the
73. This comment does not address the question of whether a manufacturer could
limit his liability by warning a potential purchaser of certain risks, or whether a
manufacturer has a duty to warn of hidden dangers. The Larsen court found that a
manufacturer does have a duty to warn. 391 F.2d at 505. The author did not find a
crashworthiness case in which the manufacturer's failure to warn or the consumer's
specialized knowledge were the deciding issues.
74. See Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W. 2d 516 (Tenn. 1973).
75. 336 So. 2d at 88.
76. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965) notes: "The rule stated
in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's
hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be un-
reasonably dangerous to him." The Restatement's definition appears to equate a defect
with an unreasonably dangerous condition. Such a broad definition would encompass
design features, but in West the Florida Supreme Court stressed that the plaintiff must
establish both "the defect and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product ....
336 So. 2d at 87.
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manufacturer. It is not contemplated that a manufacturer should be
made the insurer of all physical injuries caused by his products." 7
A requirement that liability be tied to a manufacturing defect is
unrealistic in a crashworthiness case. Dean Keeton has defined defect
of manufacture as a "condition of the property of which the manu-
facturer was unaware at the time of sale" which made the product
"different from products of like kind.' ' 78 A design feature, on the
other hand, is probably exactly as the manufacturer intended and
common to all similar models of that product.7 9 A design may be
adjudged defective only because it causes injury in a collision. As
one writer has commented: "If 'defectiveness' of a car is to be judged
by its performance in a collision, then every car is arguably 'defective'
in some way since one can always contend in retrospect that it could
have been made 'safer,' depending on the circumstances."80 In other
words, the design is not unreasonably dangerous because it is defective;
it is defective because it is unreasonably dangerous. The important
characteristic of the design is its unreasonable dangerousness.8 1
The manufacturer's conscious design choices can be judged solely
by a standard of reasonableness. The court must balance the likelihood
and the seriousness of the injury against the burden of designing the
automobile to prevent that injury. Such a test was applied by Judge
Learned Hand in 1947,82 and a similar test was recently approved by
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case involving the liability of
a designer and manufacturer of farm machinery:
In determining whether a machine is defective in design, the jury
is entitled to weigh the ease of construction of a safety device
against the magnitude of threatened harm in not constructing it.
If the latter is of great magnitude and the former is relatively
inconsequential, the trier may determine that the machine was
defectively designed. 3
Typically the parties introduce expert testimony relating to the ease
of incorporating a safer design, 4 but the jury's decision in weighing the
77. Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968).
78. Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEx. L. REv. 855, 859 (1963).
79. Id.
80. Hoenig and Goetz, supra note 33, at 24.
81. Wade, supra note 63, at 14-15.
82. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
83. Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481, 484 (10th Cir. 1975). See also
Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
84. See, e.g., Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, 616 (5th Cir. 1976);
Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 75 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
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design against the magnitude of threatened harm reflects a community
judgment of reasonableness. In effect, the jury puts itself in the place
of the "reasonable manufacturer." Based on the evidence presented
by the parties and within the limits of legal duty as prescribed by the
judge, the jury decides whether the manufacturer has made a
reasonable design choice. The jury's decision will reflect whether the
manufacturer has created a risk of injury which the community is
not willing to accept.
The court must insure that the jury's findings do not unreasonably
burden the manufacturer,8 5 and a number of courts have set out
guidelines for determining the reasonableness of an automobile design.
Some of these are
1. the state of the art when the automobile was designed;86
2. the necessity for a design to be competitive; s8
3. whether the risk is (should be) obvious to the user;"8
4. the attractiveness of the design;89
5. the price, since "a Cadillac may be expected to include more
in the way of both convenience and 'crashworthiness' than the
economy car";90
6. the inherent characteristics of various models, since a con-
vertible could not be as safe as a sedan in a rollover accident;9I
and
7. the circumstances of the accident, since any automobile may
collapse in a collision with a large truck.9 2
The courts have attempted to balance these factors in deciding if the
manufacturer created an unreasonable risk of injury. This complex
balancing process has obvious limitations. An ongoing, independent
judicial review of automobile crashworthiness must be supported by
a body of consistent safety standards; but the ability of the courts to
establish such standards is doubtful.9 3 Rather than engage in a futile
effort to set workable standards on a case-by-case basis, some courts
85. See Note, Manufacturer's Liability for Design Choices, 56 NEB. L. Rv. 422
(1977), discussing a court's responsibility to set legal criteria for determining the existence
of a design defect.
86. Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1975).
88. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). See also
note 19 supra.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1073.
91. Dyson Y. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
92. Id.
93. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication
,
73 COL. L. Rrv. 1531 (1973).
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have refused to find automobile manufacturers liable until the legisla-
ture establishes definitive safety standards to apply.94 Nonetheless, jury
decisions reached under strict judicial supervision can indicate to the
industry what the community regards as unreasonably dangerous design
features. The inability of the courts to fully police the industry does
not justify a failure to provide a forum for the injured plaintiff. The
Supreme Court of Florida made it clear in Hoffman that the most
pressing task of the courts is not to regulate manufacturers but to
Secure just and adequate compensation to accident victims who have
a good cause of action.95 The Evancho decision is a substantial step in
that direction.
ROBERT C. APGAR
Criminal Law-ARREST-COURT UPHOLDS THE RIGHT To RESIST AN
UNLAWFUL ARREST, BUT ISSUE SHOULD BE REVISITED UNDER NEW
STATUTE-Burgess v. State, 313 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
cert. denied, 326 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1976).
While on a routine midmorning patrol, Officer Gary Hitchcox
observed two men walking down a street in St. Petersburg. One
man left the other and cut through a yard, thereby arousing the
officer's suspicion. Officer Hitchcox circled the block twice and again
came upon the same two men walking together. One of the two split
off and started to cross a field. When the remaining man, Leon Norman
Burgess, spotted the officer's police cruiser, he yelled something to
: 94. E.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Evans
V. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966); Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R.; 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
: In 1966 the United States Congress enacted the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970), authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to establish
mandatory federal motor vehicle safety standards. Since then seatbelts, padded interiors,
collapsible steering columns, and other safety devices have become commonplace. In
the Safety Act, Congress specifically provided that "[c]ompliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person
from any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1970).
Apparently no court has yet considered whether a private remedy exists under the
Traffic and. Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Doak v. City of Claxton, Ga. 390 F. Supp. 753, 761
(S.D. Ga. 1975). Federal courts have inferred the existence of a civil remedy under some
federal safety statutes, however, if certain enumerated conditions are met. Id. at 759-61.
95. 280 So. 2d 431, 436-37 (Fla. 1973). See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
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